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᾽ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ ᾽ΟΜΗΡΙΚΩΣ (Cicero, Att. I, 16, 1)

By SAMUEL E. BASSETT

THE sixteenth epistle of the first book of Cicero's letters to Atticus is in reply to two questions about the unexpected outcome of the trial of Clodius: "Quaeris ex me quid acciderit de iudicio, quod tam praeter opinionem omnium factum sit, et simul vis scire quo modo ego minus quam soleam proeliatus sim; respondebo tibi ὕστερον πρότερον ᾽Ομηρικῶς." Cicero proceeds at once to answer the second question, i.e., why he was less energetic than usual at the trial, and continues: "Itaque si causam quaeris absolutionis, ut iam πρὸς τὸ πρότερον revertar, egestas iudicum fuit et turpitudine." Editors offer two interpretations of the phrase ὕστερον πρότερον ᾽Ομηρικῶς:¹ (1) Cicero has in mind the figure commonly known in modern times as *hysteron proteron*,² which was used by Homer in phrases like γαμέοντί τε γιγνομένῳ τε (δ 208); or (2) the phrase refers to the arrangement of the material in the *Odyssey* by which the situation in the tenth year after the fall of Troy is described first, and the adventures of Odysseus on his journey home are narrated afterwards.³ I wish to propose an entirely different interpretation, and at the same time to discuss a feature of Homer's style, unrecognized in modern times, which has a bearing upon the higher criticism of the Homeric poems, and which is of considerable importance for the understanding and appreciation of the art of the poet.

¹ One editor, Boot (1865), questions the genuineness of the adverb ᾽Ομηρικῶς.

² The ancient Greek grammarians called this figure *πρωτίστερον* or *ὑστερολογία*; the Roman commentators, Servius and Donatus, seem to be the only ones who use the term *hysteron proteron*.

³ Of the two passages cited by Tyrrell in his note, the first, Quint., 7, 10, 11, ubi ab initiis incipiendum, ubi *more Homérico* e mediis vel ultimis, doubtless does refer to this, but the second is not so clear: succurrit quod praeterieram . . . sed quamquam praepostere (= ὕστερον πρότερον) reddetur: *facit hoc Homerus* (Pliny, Ep. 3, 9, 28). Here it is to be noted that Pliny is replying to *questions* of his correspondent.

In the Phaeacian episode (η 238 ff.) Arete asks Odysseus three questions: 'Who are you? Who gave you those garments? Did you not say that you came hither wandering o'er the sea?' In his reply Odysseus ignores the first question, but answers the second and third, beginning, however, with the last, which concerns his wanderings. This failure of Odysseus to tell his name to Arete Kirchhof made the corner-stone of his *Nóστος*-theory.¹ Scholars no longer follow Kirchhof in this, but they disagree in the way in which they explain how the poet makes it seem natural for Odysseus to withhold his identity at this point in the narrative. It occurred to me that it might be profitable to investigate the order in which a series of questions is answered in the Homeric poems.

In the dialogue, especially where several questions are asked consecutively, Homer is at a disadvantage, compared with the dramatic poet. The Homeric manner requires every speech to begin at the beginning of the verse,² and to be preceded by a formula, usually occupying a whole verse, to introduce the speech. Since it would be unbearable to repeat this formula for each of several short questions, it follows that the questions must be as it were fired in volleys, rather than asked singly, and the answers must likewise be given in a single speech. Now when more than two questions are put consecutively a threefold arrangement of the answers is possible: the order of the questions may be retained, or varied, or reversed.

The first disposition of the answers is of course the most natural, and is found in both poems. The best example is α 180 ff., where Mentès-Athena replies in almost the exact order of the six questions asked by Telemachus: 'Who are you?' 'Mentès.' 'Where is your city?' 'I rule the Taphians.' 'In what ship did you come?' 'My own.' 'How did you happen to be sailing near

¹ Fick accepted the conclusions of Kirchhof, and Rothe in 1882 argued that in an earlier version of the poem Odysseus told the queen who he was, and that consequently the verses now found at the beginning of the ninth book (ι 16-28) originally belonged after η 242 (see Ameis-Hentze, Anhang). Rothe later (*Wider-sprüche*, 1894, 22 ff.) justified the passage as it stands, comparing other passages where a question is left unanswered.

² For the two or three exceptions, see Elderkin, *Aspects of the Speech in the Later Greek Epic*, 7 ff.

Ithaca? ' 'I am on a trading voyage to Temesa.' 'Who are your crew?' (This question has been answered.) 'Are you a guest-friend of my father?' 'I am.'

More frequently, however, the answers are arranged differently from the questions. This seems to have been due to several considerations. The first is that of *variety*, which is the more desirable because the Homeric manner permits, and both the poet and his hearers seem to have enjoyed, repetition of various kinds. An example of varied order in the answers is ζ 149 ff. (the first words exchanged between Odysseus and Nausicaa): Odysseus: (1) 'Are you a goddess? (2) Take pity on me, for I am a suppliant. (3) Show me your city. (4) Give me the wherewithal to cover my nakedness.' Nausicaa replies: 'You shall have raiment (4) [Notice that she answers the last request first]; you shall lack nothing that a suppliant should receive (2); I will point out the city to you (3); and I am the daughter of Alcinous (1).'

The consideration of variety is reenforced by two others: *poetic economy* and the *point of view of the second speaker*. The first of these is illustrated by the passage referred to above (η 238 ff.): the poet cannot allow Odysseus to tell his name until the following evening, and by changing the order in which he answers the queries of Arete the conversation passes naturally from the question of the stranger's identity to the conduct of Nausicaa. The *point of view of the second speaker* determines the order in which Noemon answers the four questions of Antinous (δ 642 ff.). Antinous asks: 'When did Telemachus leave Ithaca? Who formed his crew? Did he take his own serfs and hirelings? Did he use force in taking your ship, or did you lend it willingly?' Noemon replies first to the last question ('I lent it willingly. What else could I do?'), for he understands it to contain a threat in case it proves that he has sided with Telemachus in the rapidly growing quarrel between the Suitors and the young prince, and he wishes to remove as far as possible any ground for their hostility to him.

These three principles of variety, poetic economy and point of view of the second speaker are overshadowed in importance by a fourth, that of *continuity*. Homer had a *horror vacui* which in intensity, though not in kind, reminds one of the painter of geometric

vases.¹ He was averse to *lacunae* of all kinds. Hence, for example, he avoids intervals of time in which there is no action. As Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch remarks, "The poet evades or hurries over every flat interval." Zielinski has shown that in the arrangement of their action both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are *continuous* narratives, and as we shall see presently, the principle of continuity governs also the succession of ideas. We may also note by way of corollary, the scrupulous care with which the poet articulates his material even in its minute details.² This attention to what, since the war, we may call *liaison* contributes much to the ease with which one follows the story, and must have lessened greatly the demands upon the attention of the listener. A good example of this *liaison* is seen in the account of the advance of the two armies in the first day's battle of the *Iliad*. In the Catalogue the forces of the Achaeans are described, then the forces of the Trojans; the Trojans advance first, then the Achaeans (Γ 2, 8). But in the second onset of the two hosts (Δ 427, 433) it is the Achaeans whom we first see moving forward, because our attention has been centered on them.³ Another illustration of careful ligaturing is the custom, rarely violated in the 1300 or more speeches of the two poems, of referring to the character who has just spoken, with the words, 'Thus spoke,' or 'To him replied,' or the like. We may add the frequent use of the transitional *μέν* in such verses as A 312 f., 318 f.⁴ The poet, except

¹ Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Griech. Literatur*, 17, compares the Homeric episodes with the scenes on geometric vases in respect to their symmetry.

² See also below, pp. 54 ff.

³ Cf. also for *liaison* in a minute detail, A 15 ff.,

καὶ ἐλίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιοὺς,

Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δῶω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν·

Ἀτρεΐδαι τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί.

.

ἔνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοί

.

ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἦνδανε θυμῷ.

⁴ οἱ μὲν ἔπειτ' ἀναβάντες ἐπέπλεον ὑγρὰ κέλευθα,
λαοὺς δ' Ἀτρεΐδης ἀπολυμαίνεισθαι ἄνωγεν.

ὥς οἱ μὲν τὰ πένοντο κατὰ στρατόν· οὐδ' Ἀγαμέμνων
λῆγ' ἔριδος.

in a few instances, takes even temporary leave of his characters with courteous ease and thoughtfulness.

A similar attention to careful transitions is found in the ideas of consecutive speeches. This is seen best of all in the *Embassy to Achilles*. The ninth book of the Iliad contains more *oratio recta* than any other part of the Iliad,¹ and the speeches are of a more markedly rhetorical character. Yet if one compares them with the *ρήσεις δικανικαί* of Attic drama, for example, one notices a striking difference: in the latter, the second speaker when rebutting his opponent's arguments usually follows the same order.² Likewise in the *Ὀπλων Κρίσις* of Quintus Smyrnaeus, who was strongly influenced by Euripides, the second speaker, Odysseus, follows the order of his rival Aias in answering the charges of the latter.³ But in the *Embassy* it is quite the reverse: six speeches are made in the hut of Achilles, and in each of the first five the speaker begins with a reference to an idea that is fresh in the minds of the listener.⁴ Odysseus opens the negotiations with a reference to the feast which they have enjoyed, and with it contrasts the perilous situation of the Achaeans (vss. 225-230).⁵ Achilles in his reply, after a brief introduction, takes up first an argument made by Odysseus near the close of his long speech (vss. 315 ff. = 300 ff.). Again, Achilles closes his first speech with a reference to Phoenix (vss. 427 ff.), and this makes it natural for the latter, who is not an official ambassador, to speak before Aias. Phoenix begins his long plea by referring to the return to Phthia, which Achilles had mentioned in the last two verses of his speech (vss. 428 f.). In the reply of Achilles to Phoenix the first words echo the last words of the old man (τιμῆς, τετιμῆσθαι, vs. 608 = τίονσι, τιμῆς, vss. 603, 605 — a pretty 'chiasmus'). Finally, Aias begins the last of the three pleas with ἵομεν (vs. 625), which is suggested by the words of Achilles, οὗτοι δ' ἀγγελέουσι (vs. 617), almost at the end of his reply to Phoenix.

¹ Elderkin, *op. cit.*, 6.

² E. g., *Medea*, 475 ff., cf. 525 ff.; Soph. *Electra*, 526, cf. 558; see also J. T. Lees, *Δικανικὸς Λόγος* in Euripides, *Univ. of Nebraska Studies*, 1892, 380, 385, 396, 399.

³ Cf. Elderkin, *op. cit.*, 45 ff.

⁴ See also below, p. 52.

⁵ So in the *Odyssey* the same speaker at the beginning of the *Apologue* contrasts the *εὐφροσύνη* of the Phaeacians with his own *κῆδεα* (ι 6, ι 2).

This echoing of the last idea of a previous speech at or very near the beginning of the reply occurs repeatedly in both poems. Let us notice a few examples taken from the *Iliad*:—

(1) A 138 ff. Agamemnon threatens to take Achilles' prize of war, and closes his speech with the suggestion that Achilles go as commander of the ship in which the daughter of Chryses is to be sent home. Achilles replies first to the last point: 'How shall any Achaean readily heed thy commands to go on a journey?' (vs. 151). Then (vs. 161) he recurs to the threat to take his prize.

(2) A 159 ff. In the same speech Achilles says (vs. 159): 'We came to win honor for thee,' and concludes (vs. 169 ff.): 'Νῦν δ' εἴμι Φθίηνδ'.' Agamemnon replies: 'Flee by all means! I have others by my side to do me honor.'

(3) A 363 f., 365, Thetis: 'Why do you weep? Speak, that we both may know.' Achilles: 'Thou knowest.' (εἶδομεν: οἶσθα).

(4) Γ 54, 64, Hector: 'The gifts of Aphrodite will not avail thee.' Paris (after a preamble): 'Reproach me not with the gifts of Aphrodite.'

(5) E 177 ff., 181 ff., Aeneas: 'Unless it is some god.' Pandarus (at the beginning of a long speech): 'I think it is Diomedes, but I do not know if it is a god.' (εἰ μὴ θεός ἐστι: εἰ θεός ἐστι).

(6) E 249, 252, Sthenelus: 'Let us retire from the fight.' Diomedes: 'Speak not to me of flight.'

(7) K 551, 556, Nestor: 'Methinks some god gave them to you (i.e., the horses of Rhesus).' Odysseus: 'A god might give better horses than these.' (δόμεναι θεός: θεός δωρήσαιο).

(8) Σ 74, 79, Thetis: 'That for which thou didst pray hath been brought to pass for thee by Zeus.' Achilles: 'Aye, the Olympian hath brought this to pass for me' (τὰ μὲν δὴ τοι τετέλεσται ἐκ Διός: τὰ μὲν ἄρ μοι Ὀλύμπιος ἐξέτελεσεν).

(9) T 139 ff., 146 ff., Agamemnon: 'So rouse thee to battle, and I will render the gifts; or, if thou wilt, tarry, and the gifts shall be brought.' Achilles: 'As thou wilt about the gifts, but now let us bethink us of the battle.' (δῶρα παρασχέμεν: δῶρα παρασχέμεν).

This arrangement may be called chiasmic, but it is not the figure commonly called chiasmus. The latter is defined by the ancient grammarians as a reversal of order in the second of two subordinate

and balanced cola of a period. Professor Gildersleeve calls it "the beautiful Greek method of giving a double stress to opposing pairs, a stress that we are prone to bring about by the mechanical expedient of hammering emphasis and dead pause."¹ The arrangement which we are studying, on the contrary, is a matter neither of rhetoric nor of emphasis, but a constructive principle, based on the association of ideas, which assists the narrator to hold the attention of his listener with a minimum of effort on the part of the latter. It is the *λέξις εἰρημένη* in its widest sense, by which the *thread of the narrative*, to keep the figure, is never *snapped*, but the events and ideas follow each other in unbroken and continuous succession. If one reads the poems carefully with this point in mind, no matter in what portions he reads, he is ever finding new illustrations of this principle of continuity, and none are more striking than those which are found in the answers to two or more questions. Since our present inquiry began with the two-fold question of Atticus, let us note a few instances parallel to Cicero's order of answering the questions. This time we take our examples from the Odyssey:

(1) η 186 ff., Alcinoüs says in effect: '(1) Come, let us send the stranger home, unless (2) he is some god' (an implied query as to his identity). Odysseus replies: 'I am no god (2); so send me home (1).'

(2) λ 160 ff., Anticleia: '(1) Do you come hither on your wanderings from Troy? (2) Have you not yet reached Ithaca?' Odysseus: 'I have not yet set foot on my native soil (2); I am still a wanderer (1).'

(3) λ 210 ff., Odysseus: 'Mother, (1) why do you not tarry to embrace me? (2) Has Persephone sent an *eidolon* to deceive me?' Anticleia: 'Persephone is not deceiving you (2), but the dead have no flesh and bones for embracing (1).'

(4) λ 492 ff., Achilles: 'Tell me of (1) my son, and (2) of my father, if you have heard aught.' Odysseus: 'Of Peleus have I heard naught (2), but I can tell you of your son (1).'

(5) ξ 115 ff., Odysseus: '(1) Who was your master? (2) Perhaps I can give you tidings of him, for I have wandered far.'

¹ Pindar, Introd, p. cxv; see below, pp. 54 ff., for a discussion of the relation between chiasmus and the feature of poetic style which we are examining.

Eumaeus: 'No wanderer's tidings can have credence with my master's wife and son (2); my master was Odysseus (1).'

(6) ο 347 ff., Odysseus asks Eumaeus about (1) his mother and (2) his father. The swineherd tells first of Laertes (2) and then of Anticleia (1).

(7) ο 509 ff., Theoclymenus asks Telemachus whether he shall go for hospitality (1) to the home of some prince of Ithaca or (2) to Penelope's palace. Telemachus replies that it is impossible for his mother to see him, since she spends most of her time in the *hyperoon* (2), but that he might become the guest of Eurymachus (1).

(8) ω 106 ff. Agamemnon asks Amphimedon (1) how the Suitors came to die, and (2) whether he does not remember him. Amphimedon replies that he remembers him well (2). Then he tells of the slaughter of the suitors (1).

(9) ω 288 ff., Laertes asks the disguised Odysseus (1) how long ago it was that he saw his son, and later, (2) who he is. Odysseus replies to the second question first.

Sometimes the reversal of order is seen in the replies to three or more questions or the like. Naturally this is of less frequent occurrence. Let us notice one from either poem:—

Z 254 ff., Hecabe asks Hector (1) why he has come from the battlefield, suggesting that it is to pray to Zeus from the citadel. Then she bids him wait until she brings him wine (2) to pour a libation to Zeus, and (3) to refresh himself withal. Hector replies: 'Bring me no wine, lest I forget my prowess (3) [Compare μένος μέγα οἶνος ἀέξει, 261, with μένεος δ' ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι, 265]; I would not pour a libation to Zeus with unclean hands (2); Do thou pray to Athena (1).'

λ 170 ff., Odysseus asks the shade of his mother (1) of her own death, whether she died (2) of disease or (3) by the gentle darts of Artemis; (4) of Laertes; (5) of Telemachus; (6) whether another has taken possession of his estate and royal power; and (7) of Penelope. Anticleia replies in *exactly the opposite order* to the seven questions: 'Penelope remains in thy halls (7) [μένει, 178, μένει, 181]; no one has taken thy kingship (6); Telemachus is master of thine estate (5); thy father dwells in the fields (4); and I died, not by the gentle darts of Artemis (3), nor of disease (2), but of grief for thee (1).'

By the time I had noticed this remarkable case of reversed order in the answer to a series of questions, I was convinced that this was the kind of *hysteron proteron* which Cicero meant when he wrote to Atticus that he would answer his two questions *ὑστερον πρότερον Ὀμηρικῶς*. But the doubt at once arose in my mind whether a feature of Homeric style which had escaped the searchlight of modern scholarship, could have been known in Cicero's day. This doubt was set completely at rest when I found in van Leeuwen's note on the passage in λ a reference to *Par. Ox.* 1086.¹ This is a fragment of a commentary on B of the Iliad, and is dated about the middle of the first century, B.C. It shows the critical signs which indicate the tradition of Aristarchus, and must be independent of Didymus and Aristonicus, who are at least half a century later. The scholium on B 763 (in which the poet himself puts two questions to the Muse, and answers the second first)² is as follows: τὸ σημεῖον,³ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπήντησεν. Then follows a most interesting note on the passage in λ. The first parts of the lines are missing, but the meaning is fairly clear. It seems that a certain Praxiphanes had put forth an *aporia* on this passage, criticizing the poet for making Odysseus reserve until the last his questions about Telemachus and Penelope, since this is what he would most wish to know. Aristarchus defended Homer by reference to B 763. The scholiast continues: σημειοῦται δὲ ὅτι διὰ παντὸς [ὁ ποιητῆς οὕτως εἰς τὰ ὕστερα πρό]τερος [sic] ἀπαντᾷ κατὰ ἰδίαν συνήθειαν. 'Notice that the poet always, as here, answers the later questions first.' This seems to prove conclusively that long before Cicero wrote, Aristarchus had recognized Homer's fondness for making his characters reply to a two-fold or plural question in the

¹ *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, VIII, 1911.

² B 760 ff.,

οὔτοι ἄρ' ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν.
 τίς τ' ἄρ τῶν δ'χ' ἄριστος ἔην — σύ μοι ἐννεπέ, Μοῦσα —
 αὐτῶν ἡδ' ἵππων, οἳ ἄμ' Ἀτρεΐδῃσιν ἔποντο;
 ἵππων μὲν μέγ' ἄρισται ἔσαν Φηρητιάδαο,

 ἀνδρῶν αὖ μέγ' ἄριστος ἔην Τελαμώνιος Αἴας.

³ I. e., the *διπλῆ*, which Aristarchus used, among other things, to mark a peculiarity of style.

reverse order. "Ὑστέρον πρότερον 'Ομηρικῶς would therefore have been understood by Atticus in this sense, and not in either of the ways suggested by the commentators. The latter may be excused for their ignorance of this Aristarchan variety of *hysteron proteron*; and yet the key to the explanation had been at hand for a century and more! For the scholium of the Venetus A on B 763 reads: [τὸ σημεῖον] ὅτι πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπήντηκεν.¹

The πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπάντησις has a wider application than merely to the interpretation of a passage in Cicero: it is of importance in the entire criticism of Homer, both that which is called 'higher,' which destroys in order to rebuild the Homeric poems in most un-Homeric fashion, and the other truer criticism, whose aim is a more complete understanding and a juster estimation and appreciation of the great poet's art. We may briefly indicate this two-fold importance.

One of the points of attack of the higher critics is the order in which events are narrated in our Iliad and Odyssey. In recent years a school of criticism has arisen in Germany, which attempts to 'improve' the poems by transfer of incidents from one place to another.² We have already noticed one instance of this kind in Rothe's first treatment of the supposed difficulty in η 238 ff. Kirchhof's arguments against this passage as it stands have been sufficiently answered from various points of view;³ our principle of ὕστερον πρότερον 'Ομηρικῶς makes the failure of Odysseus to reply to the queen's first question both natural and in perfect accordance with the Homeric manner.

Again, the order of carrying out the two-fold plan of Athena (α 84 ff.), by which the problems of the Return and the Vengeance are to be solved, and the consequent need of the Assembly of the Gods at the beginning of ε, have occupied the attention of the critics since the time of Bekker. We have no time here to enter into the various objections that have been offered to the arrange-

¹ Of course the meaning, 'answered,' is not to be pressed, although ἀπαντῶ is used in this sense even in classical times; the signification as Aristarchus uses it (see below, p. 54 ff.) is rather 'recur': 'The poet recurs to the second point first.'

² See especially H. Schiller, *Beiträge zur Wiederherstellung der Odyssee*, I, II, III, 1907, 1908, 1911.

³ See Ameis-Hentze, Anhang, and Rothe, *l. c.*

ment which Homer makes; we can only indicate how the Homeric hysteron proteron may assist in removing them. But first we must notice another passage in which the order is likewise open to objection.

In α 93 Athena says that she will send Telemachus to Sparta and to sandy Pylus. This inversion of the order is said by Düntzer to be due to the exigencies of the meter.¹ Others would justify it in the same way that the recognized 'hysteron proteron' is often explained: Sparta is logically the more important, and is therefore mentioned first. Both these explanations are insufficient, for two reasons, (1) *After Telemachus has made the journey* the other order is used:²

δ 702, ἐς Πύλον ἡγαθήην ἥδ' ἐς Λακεδαίμονα δῖαν. (= ε 20)

(2) We find that in Homer the inverted order is not infrequently adopted in the carrying out of a two-fold plan or command, just as we have seen it to be true of the answers to two or more questions. A few examples from both poems will make this clear.

(1) ζ 209 f., Nausicaa bids her maids give Odysseus food and a bath in the river; Odysseus bathes before eating.

(2) η 163 ff., Echeaus urges Alcinous to command the heralds to mix wine for a libation, and the stewardess to place food before the stranger; the latter command is carried out first.

(3) θ 389 ff., Alcinous proposes that the Phaeacians give their guest a ξεινήιον, and that Euryalus make atonement for his discourteous words; the apology of Euryalus is first described, then the preparation of the gifts.

(4) ν 404-ξ 1, Athena bids Odysseus go to the hut of the swineherd and remain there until she has summoned Telemachus from Sparta; the poet describes her going before that of Odysseus.

(5) ο 75 ff., Menelaus says that he will place his gifts to Telemachus in the chariot, and will tell the maids to prepare a feast; he tells the servants first.

¹ *Philologus*, N. F., III (1890), 214.

² How little the demands of the meter determine the order of words was shown by Porson, who gave twenty transpositions of the words of a single verse of Sophocles, and all without destroying the meter (Roberts, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Literary Composition*, 14, note 2).

(6) O 55 ff., Zeus bids Hera summon Iris and Apollo; she calls Apollo, then Iris. They go to Zeus, who dispatches first Iris (vs. 158), then Apollo (vs. 221). He gives the latter a two-fold command (vss. 229-233), to take the aegis and with it to put the Achaeans to flight, and to go to the assistance of Hector and rouse his strength. Apollo goes first to Hector's aid, and it is not until vs. 308 that we hear again of the aegis with which, at vs. 322, he makes the Achaeans forget their prowess.

It would not be difficult to multiply examples. But are not these sufficient to show that in α 93 Sparta is mentioned first in the plan of Athena because the journey to Pylus, mentioned second, is to be carried out first? And does not the Homeric *hysteron proteron* which these examples illustrate likewise make entirely natural a similar reversal of order in α 84 ff.: 'Let us send Hermes to Calypso, but I will go to Ithaca?' The Homeric convention, ἡ πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον ἀπάντησις, justifies the postponement of the first part of the plan until after the second has been carried out. Certainly it would have been very simple to put the two-fold plan in the other order: 'I will go to Ithaca, etc., σοὶ δ' αὐτῷ μελέτω, Κρονίδη, πολυμήτις Ὀδυσσεύς.' This would have put squarely upon the shoulders of Zeus the responsibility for sending Hermes to Calypso, and so would have given to the critics a better justification for their objections to the Assembly in ε. But they might well have objected to the suggested verse as being — what it really is — a weak imitation of O 231! *And it would not have been Homeric.* For the inverted order is so widely distributed throughout the poems, and is used for such a variety of purposes, that we are justified in regarding it as the natural order for the poet to adopt at his discretion. Doubtless a closer examination of the poems than I have been able to give will reveal many other passages where the objections of the critics disappear upon the application of the principle of ὕστερον πρότερον Ὀμηρικῶς. Certainly the Chorizontes and the other Dismemberers of Homer should be asked to explain why, if their theory of divers authors is correct, a feature of style so marked as this is found not only in both Iliad and Odyssey, but in parts which they regard as of widely differing dates, the Second Necyia and the Telemachy, as well as the Apologue and the

Vengeance, and the Doloneia, the Diomedea, and the Embassy to Achilles, as well as the Menis.

We have by no means exhausted all the ways in which the inverted order is employed by Homer. We note, for example, the following neat use of the Homeric *hysteron proteron* in description: ι ιι7 ff., Odysseus first *describes* Wild Goat Island: (1) 'It was neither very far from, nor very near, the land of the Cyclopes; (2) there were wild goats upon it; (3) there was a fine harbor.' Then he *narrates*: 'We entered the harbor (3); we hunted the goats (2), and we looked off to the land of the Cyclopes (1).' Other varieties of the figure are noted by Aristarchus. Lehrs (*Aristarchus*², 11), to indicate the significance of the *diplê* and the Aristarchan source of certain kinds of scholia, collected more than a score of passages to which the grammarian prefixed the sign, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπαντᾷ, or the like. These we shall discuss later. None of them illustrates any of the particular kinds of inverted order that have been considered thus far. Doubtless the collection of Lehrs is far from complete, and many more scholia bearing upon the Aristarchan *deuteron proteron* are to be found. Certainly Lehrs failed to include at least the scholium on B 763, the only one which refers to the inverted order in answers to questions, and which was available in his lifetime. This omission brings us to the second way in which ὕστερον πρότερον Ὀμηρικῶς bears upon the criticism of the Homeric poems, that is, its importance in helping us to understand the secret of the poet's art.

It must be admitted that, in making my collections, I had failed, as Lehrs did, to notice B 763 and its scholium. Consequently I had not read the comment of Eustathius upon this verse. I was not a little gratified, therefore, to find that my own theory of the chief reason for the inverted order in the answer to two or more questions, i.e., continuity, was also that of the erudite archbishop of Thessalonica, for he explains the inversion in B 763 as being διὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τοῦ λόγου. Encouraged by the feeling that my researches thus far had the sanction of the church I delved deeper into the amplitudinous commentaries of the learned prelate, and found to my further satisfaction that he too had marked as a peculiarity of Homeric style the careful liaison between the speeches

in the Embassy to Achilles (761, 10, cf. 765, 5, and 769, 47): καὶ ὁ Φοῖνιξ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος καθὰ ποιεῖν Ὅμηρῳ σύνθητες, καὶ ἀπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν, ὃ φασι, παρὰ πόδας λαμβάνει τὸ πρεσβευτικὸν προοίμιον, ὥς περ Ὀδυσσεὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ, that is, it is habitual with Homer to proceed from the thought of the moment, and from the ideas which are, one says, 'uppermost in the mind.' This comment is most illuminating. It throws a clear light upon the principle underlying the use of the Homeric hysteron proteron, and links it with many other features peculiar to Homer, which scholars, both ancient and modern, have pointed out. One of these is the λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου of Aristarchus himself.¹ Another is Zielinski's law of the continuous narrative,² for the reason why the poet cannot go backward in his narrative is that this would not show a sufficient regard for what was 'uppermost in the mind.' Still another illustration of the principle is Bougot's law of affinity,³ which he applies to the arrangement of episodes, the choice of scenes, their details and the characters who take part in them, and the succession of ideas in each speech.⁴ Finally, the late Professor Seymour's penetrating observation of the use of an adjective or a participle at the beginning of the verse or of the second half-verse as a transition to the idea which follows,⁵ reveals only another illustration of the poet's habit of proceeding ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος.

In this principle seems to lie the very essence of the great poet's matchless art. This was partially indicated by Classen, nearly three-quarters of a century ago.⁶ In explaining many rhetorical figures and grammatical constructions of the Greek language which appear strange to us, Classen emphasized the peculiarly subjective character of the Greek spirit, and added: "The form of the expression is fixed and controlled more by the vividness of the

¹ Cf. Hans Dachs, *Die λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου*, Erlangen, 1913, reviewed by Professor Scott, *Class. Phil.*, IX, 329.

² *Die Behandlung gleichzeitigen Ereignisses im antiken Epos*, *Philologus*, Supplementband VIII (1899-1901), 405-449.

³ *Étude sur l'Iliade d'Homère*, 1888, 493 ff., 536 ff.

⁴ "Dans Homère une idée appelle une autre" (*op. cit.*, 536).

⁵ *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, III (1892), 98 ff.

⁶ *Über eine hervorragende Eigentümlichkeit des griechischen Sprachgebrauchs*, 1850.

author's personal, that is, by the subjective, conception, and by the vigor with which the particular moment influences his mind, than by considerations of objective truth (*op. cit.*, 196).” In other words — to apply his explanation of the commonly recognized *hysteron proteron* to the phenomenon which we are studying — oftentimes that which is *ὑστέρον τῇ φύσει* becomes *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*. This subjective attitude of mind Classen finds in all Greek authors, but most prominently developed in the greatest masters, Homer first of all.

Classen's explanation is excellent as far as it goes; it fails, however, to consider the relation of the poet to his listeners and to the characters of his tale. We must combine the observation of Classen with that of Eustathius, and explain *ὑστέρον πρότερον Ὀμηρικῶς* in the widest sense of the term as being due to the overwhelming influence of what at the moment is ‘uppermost in the mind’ of the characters of the story, the listeners, and the poet himself.

APPENDIX

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ARISTARCHAN DEUTERON PROTERON AND CHIASMUS

THE preceding exposition is open to the natural objection that the inverted order which has been noted is after all nothing but chiasmus in an extended meaning of the term. This is true, but it does not help us to understand why the poet adopted this arrangement, for we know too little about the origin and use of this figure. Chiasmus deserves to be studied historically and with reference to the different literary genres. At present all that we can do is to state the problem and suggest a possible solution. It must be understood that any conclusions which may be reached are given with considerable diffidence, and only in the hope that they may lead to a careful study of the phenomenon, based upon a complete collection of material.

We must first notice the varieties of the Aristarchan deuteron proteron which are revealed by the scholia mentioned by Lehrs (*Aristarchus*,² 11), and a few others. They may be described thus:

I. The inversion of the order concerns the answers to two or more questions: B 763 ff., λ 170-203. These have been discussed already (above, p. 45 ff.).

II. Two or more persons are named, and in the sequel the first reference is to the last mentioned.

(a) The last mentioned name is repeated:

Z 197 f., Ἰσανδρόν τε καὶ Ἰππόλοχον καὶ Λαοδάμειαν.
Λαοδαμείη μὲν παρελέξατο μητιέτα Ζεύς.

N 1, Hector, the first to enter within the wall, is mentioned second (Schol. T). Also B 642, I 531, λ 221, O 8, T 67.

(b) Two names are mentioned, and the narrative proceeds with ὁ μὲν, or the like, referring to the second name, e.g., H 1-11, Hector, Alexander (ὁ μὲν . . . Ἑκτωρ δέ). Also H 275, 306, λ 834, Ξ 391, O 330, Σ 595, Ω 605.

(c) Similarly, two names are mentioned, and a relative clause follows, referring to the second: B 629, 'Meges, who was the son of Phyleus, who in days of yore sought a new home in Dulichium' (the second relative referring to Phyleus rather than to Meges). Also N 793, T 233, Ψ 679.

III. A single case closely resembles chiasmus in the ordinary sense in which the term is used:

Δ 450 f., ἐνθα δ' ἄμ' οἰμωγή τε καὶ εὐχολή πέλεν ἀνδρῶν
ἀλλύντων καὶ ἀλλυμένων.

Here the participles refer to the nouns in reversed order. This passage, together with another (Γ 103 ff.) will be discussed later.

IV. Finally, there are passages where the scholiast notes exceptions to the rule, that is, where the poet recurs to the first-mentioned thought or person: Z 219, Δ 109, O 6, 7. (Schol. T. refers also to B 493 f., 620 f., Δ 20 ff.) O 56, Π 251, Σ 406, X 158.

It is probable that a complete collation of all the scholia will throw more light upon the Aristarchan doctrine, but even those which have been given show clearly the importance which the great Alexandrian scholar laid upon the inversion of the natural order. That he regarded it as the rule in Homer is plain, not only from the expressions, *συνήθως* (Schol. A on Σ 595); *διὰ παντός, κατὰ ἰδίαν συνήθειαν* (Ox. Pap. 1086, on B 763, see above, p. 47); *ὡς ἐπίπαν* (Schol. A on O 56), and *παρὰ τὸ εἰθισμένον πρὸς τὸ πρότερον ἀπήνητησεν* (Schol. A on B 621), but also from the pains which he takes to explain and justify violations of the rule:

Δ 109. The poet has mentioned Isus and Antiphus, sons of Priam, and has told of their capture and subsequent release by Achilles; he now describes how Agamemnon slew them: *τὸν μὲν* (= Isus) . . . *Ἀντιφὸν αἶδ.* Schol. A comments, "He repeats the name because two have been mentioned, and his purpose in not inverting the order is to explain in what part of the body each of the two is wounded." The meaning of the latter part of this scholium is hard to guess, but we can see that Aristarchus is endeavoring to account for the failure of the poet to observe *deuteron proteron*.

O 6 ff.

*ἶδε δὲ Τρῶας καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς,
τοὺς μὲν ὀρινομένους, τοὺς δὲ κλονέοντας ὅπισθεν
Ἀργείους, μετὰ δὲ σφί Ποσειδάωνα ἄνακτα.*

In vs. 7 *τοὺς μὲν* refers to the Trojans and there is consequently no *deuteron proteron* (so Schol. T.) On *Ἀργείους* Schol. A remarks, "The name is repeated for the sake of clearness," that is to say, the reader, expecting *deuteron proteron* in vs. 7, would be likely to misunderstand the reference of the pronouns, and has to be assisted by the addition of *Ἀργείους*.

The majority of the scholia on the passages which have been cited merely indicate that the *diplê* is prefixed to the verse to call attention to the *deuteron proteron*. Evidently Aristarchus was attempting by numerous examples to establish the principle as a law of Homeric poetry, in spite of the fact that, as even the casual reader may see, and as I have not thought it necessary to point out, the evidence has been forced repeatedly. But at any rate, having proved to his own satisfaction that *deuteron proteron* is the rule in Homer, Aristarchus proceeds to use it in both the interpretation and the criticism of the text:

Schol. T on Ψ 679 calls attention to the *deuteron proteron*, and Schol. A adds, "The relative clause, 'who came to Thebes of yore,' must be understood as referring to Macisteus, and not to Euryalus, as *Crates* (the Pergamene rival of Aristarchus) *takes it*." i.e., the failure to recognize the principle of *deuteron proteron* has led Crates astray in his interpretation.

O 56-77. This is a famous case of Aristarchan *athetesis*. Among the many reasons given for the rejection of these twenty-two verses we are surprised to find the following (Schol. A): "And because, although the poet generally (ὡς ἐπίπαν) recurs to the second idea first, here he has recurred to the first."

The great grammarian was not free from the weakness which has marred the work of many other great Homeric scholars, modern as well as ancient: not content with calling attention to some newly-discovered feature of the poems, they deduce from this a so-called 'law,' with which they wish to fetter the poet's genius. They fail to remember that all true poets are above petty rules — and the great poet most of all. Sometimes, however, the scholar's prestige carries with it conviction in spite of evidence to the contrary. This was happily not true of Aristarchus and his deuteron proteron. There were so many exceptions to his rule that they could not long remain unnoticed. His position was soon challenged. Our evidence for this, although slight, seems unimpeachable. It is found in the Townley scholia and in Eustathius, who is apparently following the same tradition.

Schol. T on O 6, 7 (cited above, p. 55) ὅτι αἰὲ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ὑπαντᾷ ὁ ποιητής, ὡς καὶ (three examples are given, B 493, 620, Δ 20) . . . καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ <παρα>τίθησιν ὁ Ἐπαφρόδιτος. The adverb αἰὲ points clearly to polemic against Aristarchus. Therefore we cannot agree with Lehrs (*l. c.*) that *all* the scholia which refer to reversed order in repetitions are derived from the Alexandrian. Schol. T, in at least four other places (on O 56, 2, O 330, Σ 406, X 158), calls attention to the failure to observe deuteron proteron, and always without comment or attempt to explain or justify the failure. The scholiast of the Venetus A, on the other hand, never observes the passages where deuteron proteron is violated, except to explain them away.¹ Furthermore, the Townley scholiast invariably uses πρῶτον and some form of ὑπαντᾷ, while the Venetus A regularly prefers πρότερον and ἀπαντᾷ. Was the source of the Townley scholia on these passages Epaphroditus (latter part of the first century after Christ), or do they go back to the tradition of Crates? We should like to think that the latter is the ultimate source, because of the rivalry existing between him and Aristarchus. Our evidence, however, is rather tenuous. Schol. T on X 158 comments: ὅτι πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ὑπήντησε καὶ τῷ ἀντιθέτῳ σχήματι χρῆται, and on Ω 605 (a case of deuteron proteron), ῥητορικῶς ἀνέστρεψε τὴν διήγησιν. These are both *rhetorical* comments, and we know that the Stoics of Pergamum under the leadership of Crates paid more attention to rhetoric than did the Alexandrians under Aristarchus.

We have no wish to push the case for Crates as author of the polemic against the Aristarchan deuteron proteron; further study of the scholia may prove the value or the worthlessness of our suggestion, which is hardly more than a guess. What is of importance in the evidence just presented,

¹ Schol. A on Z 219 is an exception, but here we find σημειοῦνται τινες, i.e. the source of the scholium is not Aristarchus.

however, is that at least two of the scholia treat the Aristarchan deuteron proteron, or the failure to observe it, as a *matter of rhetoric*. Here we have the link which connects the phenomenon which we have been studying with chiasmus.

We must now leave the scholia and turn to the commentaries of Eustathius. The latter, as Lehnert has shown by innumerable examples,¹ was steeped in the rhetoric of Hermogenes, and derived his own rhetorical comments on Homer rather from the treatises of 'The Rhetorician' than from the scholia. Eustathius refers twice to the Aristarchan deuteron proteron, in both cases to refute the doctrine (but cf. also p. 682, 38, where he calls attention to the *καινότροπον σχῆμα* of H 306).

The first passage is p. 1005, 53, on O 56-77, the famous *athetesis* of Aristarchus, mentioned above. Eustathius first gives the arguments of the Obelisers, and uses almost the words of Schol. A (see above p. 56). Then he cites the counter-arguments of the Exegetes, in the course of which we read (1006, 7), "Moreover the recurrence to the first point (ἡ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀπάντησις) is not unusual, as we have shown above," i.e., p. 1002, 2, on O 8. When we turn to this passage we find this comment: "They err who say that the poet *always* recurs to the second point first." Then Eustathius cites examples of the failure to observe deuteron proteron — both those which Schol. T referred to Epaphroditus, and several others. On the basis of these he argues, very sanely, that the poet uses now the normal, now the inverted, order, and he remarks that the former is the clearer and more natural, the latter not very clear, "yet ornate and befitting the elevated style of poetry" (ἐμπερίβολον δὲ καὶ πρέπον μεγέθει ποιήσεως). He concludes with a reference to his comment on Γ 103, where the question is discussed at greater length. Before discussing the latter passage we must notice his comment on Δ 450 f., ἐνθα δ' ἄμ' οἰμωγὴ τε καὶ εὐχολὴ πέλεν ἀνδρῶν

ὀλλύντων καὶ ὀλλυμένων (p. 496, 14).


"The natural arrangement of words would be οἰμωγὴ ὀλλυμένων, followed by εὐχολὴ ὀλλύντων. But Homer at times adopts a rather novel order, placing the nouns by themselves and the participles by themselves, the second noun being followed by its own participle, and this in turn by the participle which belongs to the first noun. Many other examples of this arrangement are found, as has been indicated more fully in the commentary on Book III. Another example is 'Bitter and sweet of honey and wormwood': the juxtaposition of 'sweet' and 'honey' contributes to the continuity of thought" (συνεχῇ πως τὸν λόγον ποιεῖ, cf. διὰ τὸ συνεχές τοῦ λόγου, 339, 24, cited above, p. 51).

The passage to which Eustathius twice refers for a fuller discussion of Homer's 'novel order' of words (390, 2, on Γ 103) is in brief as follows:


οἴσετε δ' ἄρν', ἕτερον λευκόν, ἐτέρην δὲ μέλαιναν,
Γῇ τε καὶ Ἡελίῳ.

¹ *De scholiis ad Homerum rhetoricis*, Leipzig, 1896.

“The order of words results in a lack of clearness, and in a distorted and artificial form of sentence like that which is called ‘periodic’ and ‘chiastic’ and ‘composed of four cola.’ The natural order — and the clearest — would be, ‘Bring two lambs, one white, for Helius, and one black, for the Earth,’ the adjectives being placed each close to its appropriate noun — an arrangement which we might call ‘linear.’ Next to this in clearness and natural order, would be, ‘Bring two lambs, white and black, for Sun and Earth.’ This arrangement, in which the second pair of words follows the order of the first pair, may be illustrated by a square figure as follows:



But the poet has made the meaning still more indistinct by arranging the four words like an X, as in the following diagram, the relation of the adjectives to their nouns being indicated by the diagonals of the square:



This is artificial and contorted: the poet has imitated a man whose mind is confused, and one who is not at home in arranging words naturally. A

similar striving for effect is found in the arrangement, not of single words (as in Γ 103, Δ 450 f.), but of larger units of thought, for example: 'Achilles was chosen polemarch, and the princes tarried by the ships; they were to keep the Trojans within their walls, while he ravaged the country round about.' This figure is 'ornate' because of the transposition of the thoughts. Yet it possesses a certain degree of clearness and naturalness resulting from the balance between the two mean terms and the two extremes. The following diagram will make clear what I mean:

Groaning	Exulting	Slayers	Slain
White	Black	Earth	Sun
Achilles	Princes	They	He "

The difference between the Eustathian and the Aristarchan treatment of Homer's inversion of the natural order of words and thoughts is fundamental: the one is based on rhetoric, for it has reference only to the form of the sentence, the style appropriate to poetry, ethopoeia; the other considers the phenomenon only as an aid to interpretation and criticism. These two views must be harmonized if we are to give a proper value to this feature of Greek and Roman literature. The problem has not received the attention that it deserves. In modern editions we often find the remark, "Note the chiasmic order," but rarely any reason for doing this. Yet if chiasmus is merely a rhetorical trick of style, discovered and named by the ancient grammarians, it may be queried whether the student is sufficiently repaid for assuming this added burden of scholastic baggage. The only reason for 'noting the chiasmus' is that it is important for an appreciation of the spirit of the language, the connection or the coloring of the thought, the emotion of the speaker, the style of the author, or his peculiar way of arranging both the smaller elements and the larger masses of his material. If chiasmus is to be more than a scholastic legacy of doubtful value, its function and significance should be explained.

The problem may be stated more fully if we adopt for the present the following premise: Rhetoric had its origin to a considerable extent in the attempt to give to prose the same qualities of beauty which its elder sister, poetry, already possessed, that is, form and ornament. We may therefore look to poetry for the origin of chiasmus, and may ask how far the chiasmic order was determined by each of the following elements: euphony, rhythm, avoidance of monotony; arrangement of ideas, that is, emphasis, poetic economy and possibly the element of surprise which sharpens the attention of the listener; and finally, as we have suggested above, the psychological factor, the advantage of using one idea to suggest another, and thus to make the thought continuous.

To illustrate, let us take an author who apparently uses the inverted order more than any other prose writer, Plato. Norden (*Kunstprosa*, I, 111) has given good reasons for believing that Plato is free from the sophistic tricks of style except in certain half-playful passages or else in downright parody. In general we may therefore assume that chiasmus in the Platonic dialogues was not due to the influence of formal rhetoric. Plato's word-order is exceedingly free, yet no ancient writer ever gave more thought to this feature of his style: Dionysius Hal., *De Comp. Verb.*, XXV (Roberts' translation), "Plato did not cease, when eighty years old, to comb and curl his dialogues and reshape them in every way. Surely every scholar is acquainted with the stories of Plato's passion for taking pains, especially that of the tablet which they say was found after his death, with the beginning of the *Republic* ('I went down yesterday to the Piraeus together with Glaucon the son of Ariston') arranged in elaborately varying orders." Two facts may help to account for this unusual care in the arrangement of words: Plato was a poet, by nature and by early training, and his style was based on the tone of conversation, if not on the actual Socratic manner of speech. If therefore we take an early dialogue like the *Apology*, written in all probability when the influence of Socrates was still fresh, and when the wooing of the Muse had not been largely forgotten because of the seductions of philosophy, we may gain some light upon our problem.

In the *Apology* I have noticed nearly a score of passages where in the arrangement of modifiers, or in the repetition of words or ideas, the order is inverted. I append these, together with a brief indication of what seems to me to be the chief reason for the inversion. The study of a very large number of similar cases would probably show how far the reasons which I have assigned are correct.

- 17 B. *κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ῥήμασι τε καὶ ὀνόμασι : οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους*
(*εἰκὴ λεγόμενα : τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασιν* (cf. T. D. Seymour, *Class. Rev.*, XVI, 27 f.) (Emotional)
- 19 C, D. *οὔτε μέγα : οὔτε συμκρόν* (ἢ *συμκρόν : ἡ μέγα*. (Variety)
- 20 C, D. *αἱ διαβολαί : φημὴ τε καὶ λόγος* (τὸ τε ὄνομα : καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. (Emotional, as the intervening words indicate.)
- 24 C. Socrates reverses the order of the two counts in the indictment (cf. 18 C. and Xen. *Mem.* I, 1, 1.) (Economy)
- 25 B. *οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες : πάντες ἄνθρωποι* (εἰς δὲ τις : ὁ διαφθείρων. (Emphasis)
- 25 C. *ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς : ἢ πονηροῖς* (οἱ μὲν πονηροί : οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοί. (Continuity: a genuine case of Aristarchan *deuteron proteron*.)
- 25 D. *σύ : ἐμοῦ* (τηλικούτου ὄντος : τηλικόσδε ὦν. (Emphasis; this, too, may be paralleled in Homer: Δ 450 f.)
- 27 A. *χαριεντιζομένου : καὶ ἐναντία λέγοντος* (φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν : καὶ τοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος. (Emotional)
- 28 A. *διαβολὴ τε : καὶ φθόνος* (18 D, φθόνῳ : καὶ διαβολῇ. (Variety)

- 29 A, B. οἶδε οὐδεὶς εἰ τυγχάνει μεγίστον δν τῶν ἀγαθῶν : ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν οἶδα)
(πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχά-
νει. (Emotional)
- 29 D. χρημάτων μὲν . . . ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὥς πλείστα : καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς)
(φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας : καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὥς βελτίστη ἔσται.
(Emotional; there is a secondary inversion here: ἔσται ὥς πλείστα)
(ὥς βελτίστη ἔσται)
- 30 A. καὶ ξένῳ : καὶ ἀσπῶ) (23 B, καὶ τῶν ἀσπῶν : καὶ τῶν ξένων. (The natural
order is the second: the first seems to be used for the sake of variety,
but it also suggests the thought which follows).
- 31 E. διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα : καὶ παράνομα) (παράνομως (32 B, of the trial
of the generals) : ἄδικον (32 D, of the command of the Thirty to ar-
rest Leon of Salamis.) (Continuity)
- 31 C. ἰδίᾳ μὲν . . . : δημοσίᾳ δέ) (33 A, δημοσίᾳ τε : καὶ ἰδίᾳ. (Continuity
and Economy; cf. *Class. Jour.*, XIII, 282 f.)
- 34 C, D. παιδία τε : καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων) (καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοί εἰσι : καὶ νιεῖς . . .
δύο δὲ παιδία. (Emotional)
- 39 D. οὔτε δυνατὴ : οὔτε καλὴ) (καὶ καλλίστη : καὶ ῥάστη. (Variety)
- 40 D. νύκτας τε : καὶ ἡμέρας) (ἡμέρας : καὶ νύκτας. (Variety)

These instances are too few to justify any sound generalization from them. Yet one cannot refrain from querying whether Plato was not influenced by Homer more than is generally admitted. Certainly the Platonic dialogues have many features in common with the Homeric poems. In both the author keeps himself in the background, putting his thoughts entirely or largely into the mouth of his characters; both show throughout a gentle humor, and at times even comedy,¹ and both arrange their material in episodes, which are nevertheless linked together by the choice of a central figure on whom the attention is focused. These and other similarities may have no causal connection. And yet in ancient times the strong influence of Homer on Plato was recognized. Ammonius, successor to Aristarchus, wrote a treatise on Plato's borrowings from Homer (Schol. A on I 540; see Roberts, *Longinus On The Sublime*, 9, Note 1). The author of the essay *On The Sublime* (XIII, 3 f.) calls Plato "above all others Ὅμηρικώτατος, who from the great Homeric source drew innumerable tributary streams." And he even goes so far as to suggest that "there would not have been so fine a bloom of perfection on Plato's philosophical doctrines, and that he would not in many cases have found his way to poetical subject-matter and modes of expression, unless he had with all his heart and mind struggled with Homer for the primacy, entering the lists like a young champion matched against the man whom all admire, and showing perhaps too much love of contention, and breaking a lance with him as it were, but deriving some profit from the

¹ Cf. the paper by Dr. William Chase Greene in the present volume, pp. 63-123.

contest none the less." (Roberts, *op. cit.*, 81). Either Plato derived from Homer his fondness for the inverted order,¹ or else deuteron proteron is only a natural feature of all poetry and poetic prose.² Certainly it differs from the chiasmus of formal rhetoric. The extent and quality of this difference, and the true explanation of its use must await further study. If our fragmentary discussion shall lead to a thorough investigation of the phenomenon, perhaps the imperfection of its method may be excused.

¹ Note also these three instances of Homeric hysteron proteron in the answer to a two-fold question:

Lysis 203 A, καί με προσιόντα ὁ Ἰπποθάλης ἰδὼν,¹ ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ποῦ δὴ καὶ πόθεν;

Ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πορεύομαι εὐθὺς Λυκείου.

Prot. 309 B, ET. ἡ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει; καὶ πῶς πρὸς σέ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;

ΣΩ. Εὖ, ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, . . . καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι.

Phaedrus 227 A,

ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῦ καὶ πόθεν;

ΦΑΙ. Παρὰ Λυσίου, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου, πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἐξω τείχους.

² It is also possible that the popularity of the Gorgian antithesis may have led Plato to prefer the reversed order by way of protest.